

CAS 2025/A/11866 Lynx FC v. Yevhen Troianovskyi & FIFA

ARBITRAL AWARD

delivered by the

COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT

sitting in the following composition:

Sole Arbitrator: Mr Fabio **Iudica**, Attorney-at-Law, Milan, Italy

in the arbitration between

Lynx FC, Gibraltar

Represented by Mr Christopher Miles, Attorney-at-Law in Gibraltar

- Appellant -

and

Yevhen Troianovskyi, Kyiv, Ukraine

- First Respondent -

and

Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), Switzerland

Represented by Mr Miguel Liétard Fernández-Palacios, FIFA Director of Litigation

- Second Respondent -

I. THE PARTIES

1. Lynx FC (the “Appellant” or the “Club”) is a professional football club with its registered office in Gibraltar (British Overseas Territory), competing in the Gibraltar Football League. The Club is a member of the Gibraltar Football Association (“GFA”), which in turn is affiliated to FIFA.
2. Mr Yevhen Troianovski (the “First Respondent” or the “Player”) is a professional football player of Ukrainian nationality, born on 2 July 1993.
3. FIFA (or the “Second Respondent”) is an association under Swiss law, with its headquarters in Zurich, Switzerland. It is the governing body of football worldwide.
4. The Appellant and the Respondents are jointly referred to as the “Parties”.

II. INTRODUCTION

5. This appeal is brought by the Club against a decision rendered by the Dispute Resolution Chamber of the FIFA Football Tribunal (also referred to as the “DRC” or the “Chamber”) on 6 June 2025, the grounds of which were served on 30 September 2025, regarding an employment-related dispute concerning the player Yevhen Troianovski (the “Appealed Decision”).

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Background Facts

6. Below is a summary of the main relevant facts and allegations based on the Parties’ written submissions, and the evidence examined in the course of the proceedings. Additional facts and allegations may be set out, where relevant, in connection with the further legal discussion. While the Sole Arbitrator has considered all the facts, allegations, legal arguments and evidence submitted by the Parties in their written submissions in the present proceedings, he refers in the Award only to the submissions and evidence he considers necessary to explain its reasoning.
7. On 27 July 2024, the Club and the Player entered into an employment contract valid as from 1 August 2024 until the end of the 2024/2025 sporting season (the “Employment Contract”).
8. In accordance with Article 1 of the Employment Contract, the Club undertook to pay to the Player a salary of EUR 1,000 Euro net per calendar month, in arrears, commencing on 22 August 2024.
9. It transpires from the Appealed Decision that on 15 December 2024, the Club presented the Player with a termination agreement and other documents respectively entitled “*Player release from Lynx Football Club*”, “*Proof of Contract End Date*” and “*Proof signed by former club that there is no TPO of the player’s economic rights*”. It further

transpires from the Appealed Decision that the termination agreement apparently submitted to the DRC was not signed by the Player.

10. The Player played his last game with the Club on 21 December 2024.
11. On 13 January 2025, the Player sent a notice of default to the Club granting it a 15-day deadline to pay the amount of EUR 5,000 as compensation for the termination of the Employment Contract.

B. The FIFA Proceedings

12. On 11 February 2025, the Player lodged a claim before the DRC against the Club. In essence, the Player argued that on 15 December 2024, the Club unilaterally terminated the Employment Contract by handing him several documents, including a termination agreement signed by the Club's representatives, which however he refused to sign.
13. The Player also highlighted that despite the termination, the Club agreed that he participated in one final official match on 21 December 2024.
14. The Player claimed that he was entitled to compensation for breach amounting to EUR 5,000, which according to him was equivalent to the residual value of the Employment Contract, and submitted the following requests for relief:

"1. FIFA DRC shall accept the claim of Claimant.

2. FIFA DRC shall order the Respondent to pay to the Claimant Euro's 5,000 net as Compensation, plus 5% interest p.a. as from 15 December 2024 until the date of effective payment.

3. FIFA DRC shall impose sportive sanctions on the Respondent".

15. In its reply, the Club argued that the unilateral termination was justified under the terms of the Employment Contract due to disciplinary issues, as the Player had allegedly been found under the influence of alcohol during several training sessions, meetings and league matches.
16. In this respect, the Club also claimed having repeatedly warned the Player and suspended him in September 2024, of which it alleged having notified the GFA in writing.
17. In addition, according to the Club, several alcohol containers had also been found in the Player's accommodation, and it was also alleged that they *"had to be escorted by a security team when visiting the Claimant's [i.e. First Respondent's] accommodation"*.
18. Furthermore, the Club insisted that the termination agreement had indeed been also signed by the Player and that his signature was witnessed by the *"Security Operative and the Respondent's Cleaner, who had been mobilised to the accommodation"*. The Club also confirmed that, notwithstanding the termination on 15 December 2024, the

Player was allowed to play a final game on 21 December 2024, to keep his accommodation until Christmas and to participate in the team's Christmas party.

19. In its requests for relief in the DRC proceedings, the Club requested as follows:

“(1) Undisputedly, the Claimant’s (rectius, Respondent’s) Termination was in accordance with the terms of his Player Contract.

(2) After a continuous period of gross misconduct, and a worsening failure to uphold the discipline requirements of the Respondent, the Claimant was initially suspended and subsequently [text ending in original version contained in Appealed Decision]

(3) All of these actions were advised to the Gibraltar Football Association, in writing.

(4) The Claimant, signed by hand the Respondent’s Termination Agreement.

(5) The Respondent acknowledges the final fixture of the year on 21 December but has set out the reasoning behind this event above.

(6) Therefore, in view of all the above, the Player’s claim is inadmissible.

Finally, Lynx reiterates that it has not commented on the merits of this case only because it is of the unwavering view that the Claim is entirely inadmissible.

However, for the sake of completeness, Lynx remains entrenched in the view that (i) the Player showed a flagrant disregard to his contractual provisions through his persistent gross misconduct, and (ii) contrary to the Player remarks, the persistent failure to improve this misconduct-constitute just cause to terminate an employment contract”.

20. On 6 June 2025, the DRC rendered the Appealed Decision by which the Player’s claim was partially accepted, as follows:

“1. The claim of the Claimant, Yevhen Troianovskiy, is partially accepted.

2. The Respondent, Lynx FC, must pay to the Claimant the following amounts:

*- **EUR 2,000 net as outstanding remuneration** plus 5% interest p.a. as follows:*

- 5% interest p.a. over the amount of EUR 1,000 net as from 23 November 2024 until the date of effective payment; and

- 5% interest p.a. over the amount of EUR 1,000 net as from 23 December 2024 until the date of effective payment

*- **EUR 2,516.13 net as compensation for breach of contract** plus 5% interest p.a. as from 22 December 2024 until the date of effective payment.*

3. Any further claims of the Claimant are rejected.

4. The Respondent shall be banned from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, for the next two entire and consecutive registration periods following the notification of the present decision.

*5. Full payment (including all applicable interest) shall be made to the bank account indicated in the **enclosed** Bank Account Registration Form.*

6. If the aforementioned sum plus interest is not paid within 30 days of notification of this decision, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for its consideration and formal decision.

9. This decision is rendered without costs”. (emphasis in original)

21. The grounds of the Appealed Decision can be summarized as follows.
22. First, the DRC considered that it was competent to deal with the present matter, concerning an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a Ukrainian player and a Gibraltar club, in accordance with Article 23(1) in combination with Article 22(1) lit, b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (the “RSTP”), January 2025 edition.
23. Regarding the merits, the DRC noted that, while the Parties agreed that the Employment Contract had been terminated by the Club, they disputed whether this was based on just cause.
24. The DRC observed that on 15 December 2024, the Club had submitted documents to the Player indicating that they intended to early terminate the employment relationship, including a document entitled “*Player release from Lynx Football Club*” and a termination agreement. Moreover, the DRC acknowledged that the Player was admitted to participate in one final match on 21 December 2025. As a consequence, the Chamber concluded that the Employment Contract could have only been terminated as of 22 December 2024.
25. As to the reasons for termination invoked by the Club, the DRC noted that these allegations were not supported by any evidence as the Club failed to submit the necessary documentation, despite having the burden of proof.
26. In such context, the DRC referred to Article 14 of the RSTP and to its well-established jurisprudence on just cause and recalled that the premature termination of a contract should only be an *ultima ratio* measure.
27. In the absence of any supporting evidence, the DRC considered that there was no proof to establish that any sanctions or warnings had been imposed on the Player prior to the termination of the Employment Contract and, therefore, it was concluded that the Club terminated the Employment Contract without just cause.
28. As to the consequences of the Club’s breach of contract, the DRC first observed that the outstanding remuneration at the time of termination was equivalent to 2 monthly

salaries, and that the Club was therefore liable to pay to the Player the amount of EUR 2,000 net, plus 5% interest p.a.

29. Furthermore, in accordance with Article 17(1) of the RSTP, the DRC determined that, in the absence of a compensation clause in the Employment Contract, the amount of compensation payable by the Club to the Player should be equal to the residual value of the Employment Contract until the end of the 2024/2025 sporting season which corresponds to 16 March 2025. Considering that the Player had remained unemployed after the termination of the Employment Contract, thereby being unable to mitigate his damages, the Chamber calculated that the relevant amount of EUR 2,516.13 was to be considered a reasonable and justified compensation for the breach. In addition, the Player was also granted interest at the rate of 5% p.a. on the relevant amount.
30. Moreover, the DRC focused on the further consequences of the breach of contract and referred to the application of sporting sanctions in accordance with Article 17(4) of the RSTP in case of breach during the protected period.
31. The DRC confirmed that, based on the “Definitions” section of the RSTP, the breach of contract by the Club had actually occurred within the “protected period”, which, considering the circumstances of the case, corresponds to the period of two entire seasons or two years following the entry into force of the Employment Contract.
32. The DRC also emphasized that the Club had been previously held liable for breaching other players’ contracts without just cause on several recent occasions (cases FSPD-14100; FSPD-15770 and FSDP-17365).
33. Consequently, the DRC decided that pursuant to Article 17(4) of the RSTP, the Club should be sanctioned with a ban from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, for two entire and consecutive registration periods.

IV. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT

34. On 21 October 2025, the Club filed a Statement of Appeal with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (hereinafter: the “CAS”) in accordance with Article R48 of the Code of Sports-related Arbitration (2025 edition) (hereinafter: the “CAS Code”) against the Player and FIFA with respect to the Appealed Decision. The Appellant chose English as the language of the arbitration and requested that the present case be submitted to a sole arbitrator.
35. According to the Appellant, also on 21 October 2025, the Club transferred the sum of EUR 4,704.30 to the Player’s bank account, in accordance with the payment order in point 2. of the Appealed Decision.
36. In the Statement of Appeal, the Appellant requested the CAS to revoke the transfer ban imposed by FIFA, and to order the Player to reimburse the amounts granted in the Appealed Decision.

37. On 27 October 2025, the CAS Court Office notified the Statement of Appeal to the Respondents.
38. On 29 October 2025, FIFA informed the CAS Court Office that it agreed with the appointment of a sole arbitrator in this procedure and that English be established as the language of arbitration.
39. On 31 October 2025, the Club filed its Appeal Brief in accordance with Article R51 of the CAS Code.
40. On 3 November 2025, the CAS Court Office notified the Appeal Brief to the Respondents.
41. Also on 3 November 2025, FIFA requested that the time limit for the filing of their Answer be fixed after the payment by the Appellant of its share of the advance of costs in accordance with Article R64.2 of the CAS Code.
42. On the same day, the CAS Court Office informed the Parties that the Second Respondent's time limit to file its Answer was set aside and that a new time limit would be fixed upon the Appellant's payment of its share of the advance of costs.
43. On 11 November 2025, the CAS Court Office confirmed that, in the absence of an objection from the First Respondent, English would be the language of the present arbitration and informed the Parties that in the absence of any response from the First Respondent on the Appellant's request to appoint a sole arbitrator, this would be for the President of the CAS Appeals Arbitration Division to decide.
44. On 19 November 2025, the CAS Court Office informed the Parties that the Deputy President of the CAS Appeals Division had decided to submit this case to a sole arbitrator.
45. On 28 November 2025, the Appellant requested the CAS Court Office to invite FIFA to clarify whether the registration ban imposed on the Club by the Appealed Decision was automatically stayed pending the outcome of the present appeal proceedings.
46. On the same day, the CAS Court Office invited FIFA to comment on the issue raised by the Appellant by 3 December 2025. Separately, the CAS Court Office noted that it had not heard from the First Respondent, who had until 23 November 2025 to file his Answer. The CAS Court Office also drew the Parties' attention to the fact that in accordance with Article R55 of the CAS Code, even if the First Respondent had failed to submit his Answer within the set time limit, the Sole Arbitrator may nevertheless proceed with the arbitration and deliver an award.
47. On 2 December 2025, FIFA submitted its comments on the Appellant's request for clarification to the CAS Court Office. In this regard, FIFA observed that the relevant registration ban is based on Article 17(4) of the RSTP and it is therefore "*not dependent on compliance with any financial obligations that would otherwise render it*

unenforceable on appeal. In other words, the registration ban remains enforceable (and in effect) during the course of the CAS proceedings”.

48. On 12 December 2025, the Appellant submitted a request for a stay of the Appealed Decision. In the same submission, the Club requested that the sole arbitrator proceeded to decide the present case exclusively on the basis of the Appellant’s and the Second Respondent’s written submissions, given the First Respondent’s failure to submit his Answer within the time limit of 23 November 2025.
49. On 15 December 2025, the CAS Court Office invited the Respondents to file their respective position on the Appellant’s requests for provisional measures.
50. On the same day, FIFA informed the CAS Court Office that it did not object to the stay of the Appealed Decision as to point 11(i) of the Appellant’s request (*i.e. “a stay of the Appealed Decision issued by the FIFA Dispute Tribunal on 6 June 2025 with immediate effect, pending the final award in these proceedings”*), without prejudice to FIFA’s substantive position on the merits.
51. On 17 December 2025, the First Respondent sent an email to the CAS Court Office which included his position as follows:

“In accordance with the requirements of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter referred to as the RSTP), professional footballers do not have the authority to impose or lift registration bans on any football club.

The registration ban on Lynx FC was imposed by FIFA and was based on the provisions of Article 17 of the RSTP, taking into account the violations by Lynx FC confirmed in case No. FSPD-18183.

In view of the above, any claims against the Player by Lynx FC are brought without any legal basis and are not based on international sporting requirements. Based on the above, I request that the claims of Lynx FC against Yevhen Troianovskiy & FIFA (CAS 2025/A/11866 Lynx FC v. Yevhen Troianovskiy & FIFA) be rejected in full”.
52. On 5 January 2026, the Appellant wrote a letter to the CAS Court Office urging the issuance of an order granting the stay of the Appealed Decision in order to allow the Appellant to sign and register players ahead of a match scheduled for 11 January 2026.
53. On 7 January 2026, the Deputy President of the CAS Appeals Arbitration Division issued the dispositive of an Order on Request for a Stay by which the registration ban imposed on the Club by the Appealed Decision was stayed pending the resolution of the present arbitration procedure.
54. On 27 January 2026, pursuant to Article R54 of the CAS Code and on behalf of the President of the CAS Appeals Arbitration Division, the CAS Court Office informed the Parties that the arbitral tribunal appointed to decide the present case was constituted as follows:

Sole Arbitrator: Mr Fabio Iudica, Attorney-at-Law in Milan, Italy.

55. On 24 February 2026, the CAS Court Office informed the Parties that, due to an oversight by the DHL delivery service which was only discovered later, the First Respondent had not been correctly notified of the proceedings as thought on 4 November 2025, but only on 31 January 2026. Accordingly, the First Respondent was granted a new time limit to file his Answer within the next 20 days.
56. On 19 March 2026, FIFA filed its Answer in accordance with Article R55 of the CAS Code and within the previously newly granted and extended time limit.
57. On 20 March 2026, the CAS Court Office informed the Parties that the First Respondent had not filed his Answer within the new deadline. The Parties were also invited to state whether they preferred a hearing to be held in the present matter or for the Sole Arbitrator to issue an award based solely on the Parties' written submissions.
58. On 23 March 2026, both the Appellant and the Second Respondent informed the CAS Court Office that they preferred for an award based solely on the Parties' written submissions. The First Respondent did not provide his position.
59. On 16 April 2026, the CAS Court Office received an unsolicited "Letter of Support and Reference" from the Chairman of the Board of the United Nations Peacebuilding Alliance (the "UNPBA") stating, *inter alia*, the following: "*Without entering into the substance of the present dispute, we wish to note that cases of this nature may involve operational, administrative or communication-related complexities, particularly where multiple jurisdictions, systems and timelines intersect. We understand that, in certain circumstances, communication gaps or technical issues may affect the timely exchange of information between the parties involved*" (the "UNPBA Letter").
60. On the 23 April 2026, the CAS Court Office notified the UNPBA Letter to the Parties and invited them to comment on its content by 30 April 2026.
61. On 27 April 2026, FIFA provided its comments on the UNPBA Letter stating as follows: "*In this respect, FIFA firstly notes that the cited letter does not explain the context or purpose for which it was submitted. Moreover, the position of an external entity that has no access to the file (and should not have access to the file due to the confidentiality of CAS proceedings) and was not even a party to the proceedings before the FIFA Tribunal, such as the UNPBA, is irrelevant to the legal assessment in the present matter*". FIFA concluded that the UNPBA Letter should not be admitted to the file due to its lack of relevance and substantive content. None of the other Parties provided any comments within the time-limit initially granted.
62. On 5 May 2026, the CAS Court Office informed the Parties that the Sole Arbitrator, having considered their positions with respect to the holding of a hearing, had decided to render an award based solely on the Parties' written submissions. The CAS Court Office also forwarded an Order of Procedure to the Parties which was returned to the CAS Court Office in duly signed copy by the Second Respondent on the same day and by the Appellant and the First Respondent on 6 May 2026, without any reservation.

63. On 6 May 2026, the Appellant submitted a response to the Second Respondent's comments on the UNPBA Letter and argued that *"The absence of case details in their letter is not a sign of irrelevance, as FIFA suggests, but rather, a demonstration of the UNPBA's commitment to procedural integrity and its role as a neutral international coordination platform"*. The Appellant also underlined that, while not taking sides with the Club, the UNPBA *"highlights that communication gaps and technical issues are recognised systemic challenges in such institutional processes"* and that *"The letter merely encourages the Panel to maintain a fair and balanced approach by taking into account these contextual elements, an objective that aligns with the fundamental principles of the CAS"*. Finally, the Appellant requested that the UNPBA Letter be admitted as evidence in support of the Club *"as it provides a necessary framework for understanding the administrative difficulties inherent in this matter"*.
64. The First Respondent did not submit any comments on the UNPBA Letter at any time.
65. On 13 May 2026, the CAS Court Office informed the Parties that the Sole Arbitrator had decided that the UNPBA Letter of 20 April 2026 is inadmissible and that the reasons for such decision would be included in the final award.
66. On 15 May 2026, the CAS Court Office informed the Parties that the evidentiary proceedings were now closed.
67. On 2 July 2026, the CAS Court Office notified the reasons of the Order on Request for a Stay to the Parties.

V. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

68. The following outline is a summary of the main positions of the Parties which the Sole Arbitrator considers relevant to decide the present dispute and does not comprise each and every contention put forward by the Parties. However, the Parties' written submissions, documentary evidence and the content of the Appealed Decision were all taken into consideration.

A. The Appellant's submissions and requests for relief

69. In the Appeal Brief, the Club submitted the following requests for relief:
- "In conclusion, the Appellant respectfully submits that this Panel should rule that the Chamber either did not have a legitimate basis to impose the Sanction on the Appellant and/or that the application of the Sanction is manifestly disproportionate due to the reasons set out above"*.
70. The appeal is based on the following arguments and legal submissions.
71. While points 2, 5, 6 and 7 of the Appealed Decision are accepted, the appeal is directed against point 4 regarding the imposition of the registration ban.

72. In this respect, the Club denies having committed any breach of contract as contended by the Player in the FIFA proceedings.
73. However, the Club alleges having been unable to support its defence before the DRC due to the “*lack of contemporaneous evidence at the time having adversely affected the Appellant’s ability to present their case*”.
74. Moreover, the Appellant is a small community-based football club run by volunteers who are motivated by their passion for sport. The Club has very limited financial resources with the owners being its main source of investment and sustaining the Club with their personal funds. In addition, due to its non-professional standing, the Club has never qualified for European Competition, thus not benefiting from UE fundings.
75. In this context, imposing the ban would have a catastrophic effect on the Club's very existence.
76. In this respect, the Club, referring to CAS jurisprudence (CAS 2017/A/5056; CAS 2017/A/5069), stated that the CAS could only fully confirm or entirely annul the sanction imposed by the Appealed Decision, but not reduce it.
77. The Club also acknowledges the allegations of previous contractual breaches as mentioned in the Appealed Decision which qualify the Club as a “repeat offender”. However, “*The Appellant nevertheless respectfully submits that the circumstances surrounding these incidents were not due to wilful disregard for contractual obligations but stemmed from a lack of contemporaneous documentation and administrative shortcoming at the relevant times*”.
78. Therefore, the alleged reiterated breaches arose from “*procedural deficiencies rather than deliberate misconduct and should therefore be viewed with a degree of leniency whether to impose the Sanction or not*”.
79. Furthermore, while many of the players registered with the Club are amateurs being fully employed elsewhere, they are all currently engaged with the Club under a 12-month contract with an average monthly salary of EUR 600. The highest salary amounts to EUR 1,500. This confirms the modest nature of the Club and its limited resources.
80. As a result, in the present case, the imposition of a registration ban for two consecutive registration periods was disproportionate as it would have devastating consequences on the Appellant, contrary to the principles of fairness.
81. In case of confirmation of the Appealed Decision by the CAS, given the annual term of all the players’ employment contracts with the Club, upon the expiry of the relevant contracts, the Appellant would not be able to register or sign additional or previous players. “*Consequently, upon expiration of these contracts, the Appellant would be left without any players in the senior team*”. On the other hand, the Club cannot rely on its youth teams to replace the senior players.

82. The dissolution of the senior team would result in the Club's loss of its membership to the GFA which would also have fatal consequences for the permanence of the Club's youth teams.
83. In fact, youth teams must be registered under an affiliated club to take part in their respective leagues in accordance with paragraph 5 of the GFA Youth League Rules 2025/2026.
84. The Club further argued that while in CAS 2017/A/5011, a sanction of a two-period transfer ban had been considered proportionate, this was because "*... it would only have affected the club's competitiveness relative to other clubs within its domestic league*" but that in contrast, in the present case, the same type of sanction would be manifestly disproportionate as it would not only impact the Club's competitiveness but also threaten its very existence, leading to the dissolution of the Club. The Club further argued that it has demonstrated the level of "*destruction and prejudice*" the sanction would cause in the present case if it were to be upheld and that in view of these exceptional circumstances, and in the interest of justice and proportionality, the CAS should exercise the margin of discretion recognized under the FIFA RSTP and not impose the relevant sanction on the Club (see CAS 2017/A/5011).

B. The First Respondent's submissions and requests for relief

85. As mentioned above under Section IV, although the First Respondent did not file his Answer within the terms of Article R55 of the CAS Code, his position was summarized in a communication to the CAS Court Office of 17 December 2025. This communication was sent in follow up (and within the time-limit granted) of the CAS Court Office letter of 15 December 2025, by which the Respondents had been granted the opportunity to comment on the Appellant's application for provisional measures.
86. In this communication, the Player submitted the following brief statement of defence:
 - first, in accordance with the FIFA RSTP, as a professional player, he has no authority either to impose or lift any ban on any football club;
 - second, the ban was imposed on the Club based on the provisions of Article 17 of the RSTP taking into account the Club's violation confirmed in the FIFA proceedings;
 - third, any claims brought against the Player are legally baseless and should be rejected in full.

C. The Second Respondent's submissions and requests for relief

87. In its Answer, FIFA submitted the following requests for relief:
 - “(a) reject the requests for relief sought by the Appellant;*
 - (b) confirm the Appealed Decision in its entirety;*

(c) order the Appellant to bear the full costs of these arbitration proceedings”.

88. The following is a summary of the Second Respondent’s arguments.
89. The present case deals with an employment-related dispute in relation to contractual stability and the sporting consequences for a club for the undue termination of an employment contract during the protected period in accordance with Article 17 of the FIFA RSTP.
90. The issue in dispute is whether the DRC legitimately imposed the relevant sanction on the Club and whether the registration ban for two entire sporting seasons is proportionate. The Second Respondent highlights that the Club does not dispute that it unduly terminated the Employment Contract and the relevant financial consequences. It has thereby breached the principle of *pacta sunt servanda*.
91. FIFA trusts in the legitimacy of the Appealed Decision and the correctness of the sanction given that the Club clearly terminated the Employment Contract during the protected period and has shown a history of breaches of contract in a short time before the Appealed Decision.
92. By unduly terminating the Employment Contract, the Club did not respect the principle of *pacta sunt servanda*. Furthermore, the Club acknowledged its status as a repeat offender and was therefore aware that sporting sanctions could be imposed given that its pattern of behaviour involving disrespect for the principle of *pacta sunt servanda* could be considered an aggravating factor.
93. The Appellant’s allegations of “*administrative shortcomings*” aimed at justifying its conduct have remained completely undetermined and unsubstantiated despite the burden of proof in this regard which, in accordance with Article 8 of the Swiss Civil Code (the “SCO”), rests on the Appellant. Therefore, the Appellant’s arguments should be dismissed. Furthermore, it is irrelevant whether the Club was facing a difficult period due to its administration or whether the latter committed mistakes as this is no valid justification for the Club’s failure to fulfil its obligations.
94. By unduly terminating the Employment Contract, the Club did not respect the principle of *pacta sunt servanda* and must now face the relevant consequences.
95. Not only did the Appellant terminate the Employment Contract without just cause, but it did not deny terminating the contract in the protected period.
96. As a result, in accordance with Article 17 of the RSTP, the DRC had the discretion (and correctly decided) to impose sporting sanctions to the Club. The legal basis and legitimacy for the imposition of sporting sanction in the present case is clear.
97. Moreover, the registration ban for two registration periods is the regulatory standard for cases of this kind.
98. Regarding the margin of discretion in applying sporting sanctions, in the present case the registration ban is warranted based on the following circumstances surrounding the

behaviour of the Club: **a)** the Appellant did not prove any alleged disciplinary issues regarding the Player; **b)** the Club did not respect the *ultima ratio* principle to terminate the Employment Contract; **c)** the Club's termination occurred during the protected period; **d)** the Club had already been held liable for terminating other players' contracts without just cause (FPSD-14100, FPSD-15770, FPSD-17365), which is not contested by the Appellant.

99. Given the Appellant's *blatant disrespect* for the Employment Contract, the Player, the FIFA regulations and the principle of contractual stability, the imposition of the sporting sanction was more than justified. Furthermore, there are no particular circumstances in the present case that could legitimate any deviation from the relevant provision.
100. Moreover, notwithstanding the Appellant's argument, there is no room to address the proportionality of the sanction in the matter at stake, as Article 17(4) of the FIFA RSTP does not give the DRC any margin of discretion regarding the severity of the disciplinary consequences in case of breach of contract during the protected period. The DRC can only decide whether or not to apply the registration ban for two consecutive registration period as Article 17 of the RSTP contains no provision for reducing the stipulated sporting sanction.
101. CAS has also confirmed that the imposition of a ban from registering any new player for two entire and consecutive registration periods is the standard sanction and is not considered disproportionate (CAS/2014/A/3765; CAS 2006/A/1154; CAS 2017/A/5056 & 5069).
102. The *ratio* behind this regulatory framework is clear: a breach of contract during the first two or three seasons or years shall be sanctioned more severely in order to serve as an effective deterrent to such behaviour.
103. As to the Appellant's allegations that the imposition of the sanction would have devastating consequences leading to the dissolution of the Club, they are completely unsupported and erroneous.
104. Moreover, the Club would still be able to renew the existing contracts with their registered players in order to maintain the senior team, which would fall outside the scope of the registration ban. Consequently, the youth team would also not be in danger (this in addition to that alleged danger not having been supported by evidence). Therefore, the Appellant's allegations should be dismissed.

VI. JURISDICTION

105. Article R47 of the CAS Code provides as follows:

“An appeal against the decision of a federation, association or sports-related body may be filed with CAS if the statutes or regulations of the said body so provide or if the parties have concluded a specific arbitration agreement and if the Appellant has

exhausted the legal remedies available to it prior to the appeal, in accordance with the statutes or regulations of that body.”

106. The Appellant relied on Article 57 of the FIFA Statutes as conferring jurisdiction to the CAS.
107. The Respondents did not dispute that CAS has jurisdiction in the present case.
108. The jurisdiction of the CAS was further confirmed by the signature of the Order of Procedure by the Parties.
109. Accordingly, the CAS has jurisdiction to hear the present case.

VII. ADMISSIBILITY

110. Article R49 of the CAS Code provides the following:

“In the absence of a time limit set in the statutes or regulations of the federation, association or sports-related body concerned, or in a previous agreement, the time limit for appeal shall be twenty-one days from the receipt of the decision appealed against”.

111. According to Article 50 of the FIFA Statutes, edition May 2024, *“Appeals against final decisions passed by FIFA and its bodies shall be lodged with CAS within 21 days of receipt of the decision in question”.*
112. The Sole Arbitrator notes that the Appealed Decision was rendered on 6 June 2025 and that the grounds of the Appealed Decision were notified to the Parties on 30 September 2025.
113. Considering that the Appellant filed its Statement of Appeal on 21 October 2025, i.e., within the deadline of 21 days set in the FIFA Statutes, the Sole Arbitrator is satisfied that the present appeal was filed timely.
114. Moreover, the Respondents did not contest the admissibility of the Appeal.
115. Furthermore, the appeal complied with all other requirements of Article R48 of the CAS Code and is thus admissible.

VIII. APPLICABLE LAW

116. Article R58 of the CAS Code provides the following:

“The Panel shall decide the dispute according to the applicable regulations and, subsidiarily, to the rules of law chosen by the parties or, in the absence of such a choice, according to the law of the country in which the federation, association or sports-related body which has issued the challenged decision is domiciled or

according to the rules of law that the Panel deems appropriate. In the latter case, the Panel shall give reasons for its decision”.

117. According to Article 49(2) of the FIFA Statutes, *“The provisions of the CAS Code of Sports-related Arbitration shall apply to the proceedings. CAS shall primarily apply the various regulations of FIFA and, additionally, Swiss law”.*
118. The Parties referred to the relevant FIFA Regulations, namely the FIFA RSTP, as the applicable law in the present case.
119. In consideration of the above and in accordance with the wording of Article R58 of the CAS Code, the Sole Arbitrator holds that the present dispute shall be decided principally according to the FIFA RSTP, January 2025 edition, with Swiss law applying subsidiarily.

IX. MERITS

A. Preliminary issue

120. Before entering into the merits of this case, there is a preliminary issue to be resolved first, regarding the admissibility of a document consisting of a communication letter from the UNPBA to the CAS Court Office.
121. The Sole Arbitrator recalls that on 16 April 2026, the UNPBA submitted an unsolicited and unannounced statement to the CAS Court Office which was presented as “Letter of Support and Reference”. In the accompanying e-mail, it was specified that *“this letter is provided as an independent statement reflecting our professional cooperation and general knowledge of the club’s leadership and conduct”.* Moreover, in the Letter of Support it is stated as follows: *“This note is provided strictly in a neutral and observational capacity, without prejudice to the proceedings and without expressing any position on the merits of the case”.*
122. Therefore, there is no doubt that we are not dealing with a case of “intervention” of a third party under Article R41.3 of the CAS Code.
123. Instead, in theory, the UNPBA Letter could at most be considered as an *“amicus curiae brief”* which may be admitted by panels after consultation with the parties according to Article R41.4 (6) of the CAS Code, although this possibility is given to third parties or observers rather than to persons or entities not involved in the dispute or in the procedure. The fact that the UNPBA tries to intervene in this arbitration, which is supposed to be confidential, raises some questions as to the origin of such initiative.
124. In any event, it shall be emphasized that, in CAS jurisprudence, an *“amicus curiae brief”* is described as *“an instrument allowing a non-party to a case to voluntarily offer special perspectives, arguments or expertise on a dispute, in order to assist the court in the matter before it”* (CAS 2008/A/1639).

125. This is however not the case in the present arbitration, considering the generic contents of the UNPBA Letter which, in its most salient part, states as follows: *“Without entering into the substance of the present dispute, we wish to note that cases of this nature may involve operational, administrative or communication-related complexities, particularly when multiple jurisdictions, systems and timelines intersect. We understand that, in certain circumstances, communication gaps or technical issues may affect the timely exchange of information between the parties involved”*.
126. The Sole Arbitrator notes that, while the Appellant requests that the UNPBA Letter be admitted as *“evidence in support of the Appellant as it provides a necessary framework for understanding the administrative difficulties inherent in this matter”*, FIFA objects its admissibility as it contains *“unclear, vague and overly broad statements”* and is therefore devoid of any relevance and substantive content.
127. In addition to the lack of unanimous consent by the Parties, the Sole Arbitrator finds that the UNPBA Letter does not contain any elements that could assist the Sole Arbitrator in the understanding of this case or clarify the position of the Appellant, due to its generic formulation and ambiguous content. It follows that the UNPBA Letter does not provide any contribution at all towards resolving the present dispute.
128. Furthermore, there is no other provision or other applicable principle permitting unsolicited written submissions by non-parties in a CAS arbitration proceeding. Moreover, there is no public dimension or public interest in the present case other than the one that the proceedings shall be conducted with respect of the principle of the fair trial and the good administration of justice through the correct and regular application of rules, which is the main objective of the CAS.
129. Finally, the Sole Arbitrator also finds the UNPBA Letter to be questionable considering the independent and impartial role of CAS panels.
130. In view of the above, and having duly considered the entire circumstances, the Sole Arbitrator concludes that the UNPBA Letter is not admitted to the case file and shall be disregarded.

B. The merits of the case

1. Scope of review of the present appeal

131. The present dispute relates to the imposition of sporting sanctions by the DRC on the Appellant under Article 17(4) RSTP, consisting in a ban from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, for the next two entire and consecutive registration periods following the notification of the Appealed Decision.
132. In this respect, the Sole Arbitrator notes that in the Statement of Appeal, the Appellant had requested not only that the CAS revoke the registration ban, but also that the First Respondent be ordered to refund the amount paid by the Club to the Player in compliance of point 2. of the Appealed Decision as outstanding remuneration and

compensation for breach. However, this motion was not reiterated within the requests for relief in the Appeal Brief and is therefore considered moot.

133. In fact, the Sole Arbitrator recalls that the Appellant's requests for relief in the Appeal Brief read as follows: "*the Appellant respectfully submits that this Panel should rule that the Chamber either did not have a legitimate basis to impose the Sanction on the Appellant and/or that the application of the Sanction is manifestly disproportionate due to the reasons set out above*".
134. This conclusion is also confirmed by the Appellant's clarification in para 3 of the Appeal Brief as follows: "*The Appellant accepts points 2, 5, 6, and 7*" referring to the relevant points of the operative part of the Appealed Decision, including point 2 whereby the Appellant was ordered to pay to the Player EUR 2,000 as outstanding remuneration, plus interests as well as EUR 2,516.13 as compensation for breach, plus interests. It further appears that the relevant sum, amounting to EUR 4,704.30, was paid by the Club on 21 October 2025.
135. In consideration of the above, the Sole Arbitrator's scope of review in the present matter solely relates to the issue of whether the imposition of the registration ban to the Club is warranted and proportionate or not in regard to the facts of the case.

2. The legitimate imposition of the registration ban by the FIFA DRC

136. In order to establish whether the registration ban imposed on the Club is legally founded, the Sole Arbitrator needs to address the regulatory basis for the imposition of sporting sanctions in the present case. In this respect, the Sole Arbitrator refers to Article 17 RSTP which is the provision governing the consequences of terminating a contract without just cause.
137. Article 17(4) RSTP, January 2025 edition, stipulates the following:
- "A sporting sanction shall be imposed (i) on any club found to be in breach of contract during the protected period [...] The club shall be banned from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, for two entire and consecutive registration periods. The club shall be able to register new players, either nationally or internationally, only as of the next registration period following the complete serving of the relevant sporting sanction. In particular, it may not make use of the exceptions stipulated in article 6 paragraph 3 of these regulations in order to register players at an earlier stage"*.
138. According to the FIFA RSTP, the definition of "protected period" is as follows: "*A period of three entire seasons or three years, whichever comes first, following the entry into force of a contract, where such contract is concluded prior to the 28th birthday of the professional, or two entire seasons or two years, whichever comes first, following the entry into force of a contract, where such contract is concluded after the 28th birthday of the professional*".

139. The *ratio* for imposing sporting sanctions within the FIFA regulatory system lies in the protection of contractual stability and the principle of *pacta sunt servanda* promoted by FIFA. In the event of a breach in the initial period of duration of an employment contract, which is considered to be more severe and harmful, the application of sporting sanctions - in addition to the obligation to pay compensation to the aggrieved party - is foreseen in order to serve as a further deterrent.
140. In this regulatory context, the first element to be established is whether the Employment Contract was terminated without just cause by the Club and secondly, whether such termination without just cause occurred in the protected period.
141. The fact that the Employment Contract was unilaterally terminated by the Club with effect from 22 December 2024 is undisputed.
142. As to the circumstances in which the Employment Contract was terminated, according to the Appealed Decision, the Appellant had proposed a termination agreement to the Player who refused to sign it, together with other documents confirming the Club's intention to terminate the contract. Although there is no evidence that the Club and the Player ever reached an agreement on early termination, the Employment Contract finally ended on 22 December 2024, the day following which the Player had played the last match with the Club.
143. Although the circumstances above were not disputed by the Club, in the FIFA proceedings the Appellant argued that the unilateral termination was justified under the terms of the Employment Contract due to disciplinary issues. The Appellant also stated that the Player had previously been warned and suspended but that he persisted in his wrongful behaviour. However, since none of the Club's allegations were supported by evidence, the DRC finally established that the Employment Contract had been terminated by the Club without just cause.
144. In these proceedings, the Appellant insists that it did not commit any breach of contract. However, the Club still failed to submit any supporting evidence to justify the unilateral termination of the Employment Contract. Moreover, the Appellant did not even reiterate its previous arguments concerning the Player's alleged disciplinary issues, nor of having previously been warned and suspended the Player.
145. Indeed, the Appellant's position in the Appeal Brief merely consists in the allegation that the Club was prevented from presenting its case before FIFA in the first instance due to the "*lack of contemporaneous evidence at the time*". However, inexplicably, the Appellant did not make up for this previous lack of evidence, by submitting new proof in these proceedings, despite the full power of review granted to CAS panels in accordance with Article R57 of the CAS Code.
146. In this regard, the Sole Arbitrator notes that not only did the Appellant fail to indicate, let alone demonstrate, the reasons for the alleged lack of evidence at the time of the first instance judgment. Even today, the Club completely failed to meet the burden of proof regarding the reasons for terminating the Employment Contract or the reasons for failing to submit supporting evidence. In this respect, the allegations of lack of

contemporaneous documentation, administrative shortcomings etc. have remained completely without supporting evidence, in addition to being vague and undefined.

147. In this context, in the absence of any proof that the Club had a just cause to terminate the Employment Contract, and in the absence of any valid justification for the lack of evidence, the Sole Arbitrator agrees with the FIFA finding that by terminating the Employment Contract on 15 December 2024/22 December 2024, the Appellant committed a breach of contract.
148. That being established, the Sole Arbitrator recalls that the Employment Contract was signed on 27 July 2024, when the Player had already turned 28, and terminated just few months later, falling within the “protected period”. Therefore, it is undisputed that the Club was in breach of the Employment Contract during the “protected period”.
149. Furthermore, the Appellant recognizes *“that there have been allegations of previous contractual breaches during the “protected period” and “does not seek to deny the existence of these allegations and accepts that, as a result, the Panel will characterise the Appellant as a “repeat offender”.*
150. A club is considered repeated offender if it has been held liable on several occasions in the (recent) past for the early termination of employment contracts with players without just cause (CAS 2017/A/5056 & 5069). The Sole Arbitrator recalls that, according to the Appealed Decision, the Club had been previously found liable for premature termination of employment contracts without just cause on at least three other recent occasions (Ref FPSD-15770 on 3 December 2024, Ref FPSD-17365 on 27 March 2025 and Ref FPSD 14100). As mentioned above, these circumstances are not disputed by the Club.
151. According to the Appellant, the history of repeated breaches of contract involving the Club did not originate from *“wilful disregard for contractual obligations”* but rather from *“a lack of contemporaneous documentation and administrative shortcomings at the relevant times”*. The Club insists that *“the breaches in question arose from procedural deficiencies rather than deliberate misconduct and should therefore be viewed with a degree of leniency whether to impose the Sanction or not”*. However, once again, the Appellant’s allegations are completely unsupported by evidence.
152. Consequently, the Sole Arbitrator shares the findings of the DRC that the two conditions for the application of Article 17(4) of the RSTP have been met. The Sole Arbitrator finds that the sporting sanction was imposed on the Club on a regulatory basis and according to the “principle of legality” as the offence and the associated sanction are clearly and previously defined (see CAS 2014/A/3765; CAS 2011/A/2670; CAS 2008/A/1545).
153. Nonetheless, the Appellant contends that, in accordance with the consistent practice of FIFA, sporting sanctions should not be imposed automatically and that, considering the circumstances of the present case, the imposition of a two-period ban from registration of new players is disproportionate and shall therefore be repealed.

154. The Sole Arbitrator agrees that, although the clear wording of Article 17(4) RSTP (“*A sporting sanction **shall** be imposed*”) suggests that the competent body has a duty to impose sporting sanctions whenever a club is found in breach of contract during the protected period, there is a well-established and consistent practice of the DRC, in the sense of adopting a more flexible application of the relevant provision. According to this practice, the deciding authority is granted the discretion to renounce the application of sporting sanctions, even in instances where the breach is committed during the protected period. This discretion is exercised on a case-by-case basis, taking into account any unique and specific circumstances.
155. The discretionary nature of sporting sanctions under Article 17 RSTP is confirmed by the FIFA Commentary on the RSTP: “*Despite the wording of the Regulations, the DRC’s consistent jurisprudence suggests it has a certain margin of discretion in applying sporting sanctions or not. It interprets the Regulations as granting it the power to impose sporting sanctions, rather than placing it under an obligation to do so*” (FIFA Commentary on the RSTP, edition 2023, page 211).
156. This approach is also endorsed by CAS jurisprudence (by way of example CAS 2014/A/3765; CAS 2014/A/3568; CAS 2009/A/1880 & 1881; CAS 2007/A/1358; CAS 2014/A/3754; CAS 2016/A/4550 & 4576; CAS 2024/A/10441 & 10442).
157. *Inter alia*, in CAS 2016/A/4550 & 4576, the panel held that: “*Considering this jurisprudence from the CAS, the Panel is ready to accept that Article 17 par. 3 and 17 par. 4 RSTP do not apply mandatorily, but the situation has to be analysed on a case-by-case basis, verifying in each case in particular if some general principles of law have been respected*”, such as the principle of being bound by previous standard practice, the principle of legality, equal treatment and/or good governance by imposing the sporting sanctions on the Club (CAS 2014/A/3765).
158. In particular, in CAS 2024/A/10441 & 10442, the panel found that the sporting sanction imposed on the player by the DRC was not justified and annulled the appealed decision. In that case, while the player’s breach was considered significant, the panel found the financial consequences of the breach to be adequate and sufficient. This was due to the fact that the unjustified termination of the employment contract by the player occurred before its entry into force, thereby minimizing the impact on the club and the compensation awarded to the club in that specific case was considered adequate to safeguard the principle of contractual stability.
159. In view of the foregoing, the Sole Arbitrator is satisfied that the imposition of sporting sanctions on a club found to be in breach of contract during the protected period is not mandatory, but that only particular circumstances would be required to justify refraining from the application of sporting sanction under Article 17(4) RSTP (CAS 2014/A/3754).
160. As already mentioned above, in Article 17(4) RSTP, the sanction resulting from the offence is predictable and the provision meets the requirement of a clear connection between the incriminated behavior and the sanction. The Sole Arbitrator notes that in this context, the burden lies on the offender to demonstrate that it does not deserve any

sanction, in particular in light of a possible violation of general principles of law (see CAS 2016/A/4550 & 4576).

161. In the present case, the Sole Arbitrator finds that there are no strong arguments brought forward by the Club to conclude that the DRC violated one of the above-mentioned principles to such an extent that the imposition of sporting sanctions is unwarranted. The Sole Arbitrator refers to the well-established CAS jurisprudence according to which, whenever the wording of a provision is clear, one needs clear and strong arguments to deviate from it (CAS 2009/A/1880; CAS 2007/A/1359).
162. In this respect, the Appellant's allegations regarding vague and undemonstrated administrative or procedural shortcomings or the Club's financial resources or its status as a small club are irrelevant or at least do not constitute a suitable argument to the said purpose. Likewise, the alleged amateur status of the majority of its players does not constitute valid grounds for not applying the sanction imposed. (Incidentally, the Sole Arbitrator notes that, in any event, the employment contracts submitted by the Appellant to substantiate its amateur status are contradictory and inadequate for this purpose. Indeed, all the relevant employment contracts specify the players' status as professional and on the other hand, the contracts do not indicate the stipulated salary so that it is impossible to draw any indication as to the players' status other than as professional).
163. With regard to the specific arguments put forward by the Club as to why the imposition of a two-period transfer ban would be disproportionate, the Sole Arbitrator observes that no evidence has been submitted justifying the proposition that the registration ban may lead to the dissolution of the Club. In any event, a registration ban merely prevents a club from registering new players but does not prohibit the transfer of existing players to other clubs, or to renew existing contracts with already registered players. Therefore, the Appellant's arguments are also inconsistent, besides being irrelevant with respect to the prevailing interest of FIFA in safeguarding the overarching principles of *pacta sunt servanda* and contractual stability.
164. This is all the more true considering that the Club was repeatedly found to be in a situation of breach or termination of an employment contract without just cause which is decisively a very serious aggravating factor that may legitimately lead the DRC to impose sporting sanctions on a club (CAS 2017/A/5011).
165. The Sole Arbitrator agrees that, in consideration of all the circumstances of the present case, a strict approach is necessary and that, as a repeat offender, the Club shall be treated with severity and be subject to sanction in application of the clear wording of Article 17(4) RSTP. This is to serve as a deterrent and prevent any further instances of misconduct on the part of the Club towards players and to guarantee the future enforcement of the contractual obligations deriving from employment contracts.
166. In conclusion, the Sole Arbitrator considers the following elements to be reasons why sporting sanctions should be imposed on the Club:

- The Club did not provide any evidence to justify the premature termination of the Employment Contract or any valid argument to justify derogating from the application of Article 17(4) RSTP;
- The Club's breach took place within the protected period;
- The Club was repeatedly found to be in a situation of terminating employment contracts without just cause, reaching the condition of 'repeat offender';
- The Appealed Decision is consistent with the FIFA previous practice regarding repeat offenders.

3. The proportionality of the sanction imposed by FIFA

167. In consideration of all the above, the Sole Arbitrator concurs with the DRC and holds that the imposition of sporting sanctions on the Club by the Appealed Decision is warranted and proportionate and that, therefore, the Club's appeal shall be rejected.
168. Furthermore, the Sole Arbitrator recalls that the DRC has no scope of discretion to diminish the severity of the sanction/the duration of the registration ban under Article 17 (see DRC decision 27 August 2009 n. 89733). As a consequence, if sporting sanctions are to be imposed on a club, they shall consist of a ban from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, for two entire and consecutive registration periods.
169. The discretion of the CAS panel is thus limited to either confirming the two-period transfer ban or disposing entirely of the transfer ban (CAS 2017/A/5011; CAS 2017/A/5056 & 5069).

X. CONCLUSION

170. In view of all the foregoing, the appeal lodged by the Club is rejected and the Appealed Decision is confirmed in its entirety. Accordingly, the stay granted on 7 January 2026 of the registration ban imposed in the Appealed Decision is lifted with immediate effect as of the notification of the present award.
171. Any further claims or requests for relief are dismissed.

XI. COSTS

(...)

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ON THESE GROUNDS

The Court of Arbitration for Sport rules that:

1. The Appeal filed by Lynx FC against Mr Yevhen Troianovski and FIFA on 21 October 2025 concerning the Decision issued by the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber on 6 June 2025, the grounds of which were notified to the Parties on 30 September 2025, is dismissed.
2. The Decision issued on 6 June 2025 by the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber the grounds of which were notified to the Parties on 30 September 2025 is confirmed. The stay granted on 7 January 2026 of the registration ban imposed on 6 June 2025 by the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber is lifted with immediate effect as of the notification of the present award.
3. (...).
4. (...).
5. All other motions or requests for relief are dismissed.

Seat of arbitration: Lausanne, Switzerland

Date: 5 August 2026

THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT

Fabio **Iudica**
Sole Arbitrator